Conflicting information in an agent's knowledge base may lead to a semantical defect, that is, a situation where it is impossible to draw any plausible conclusion. Finding out the reasons for the observed inconsistency (so-called diagnosis) and/or restoring consistency in a certain minimal way (so-called repairs) are frequently occurring issues in knowledge representation and reasoning. In this paper we provide a series of first results for these problems in the context of abstract argumentation theory regarding the two most important reasoning modes, namely credulous as well as sceptical acceptance. Our analysis includes the following problems regarding minimal repairs/diagnosis: existence, verification, computation of one and enumeration of all solutions. The latter problem is tackled with a version of the so-called hitting set duality first introduced by Raymond Reiter in 1987. It turns out that grounded semantics plays an outstanding role not only in terms of complexity, but also as a useful tool to reduce the search space for diagnoses regarding other semantics.
Introduction
A well-known problem in knowledge representation and reasoning is the semantical collapse of an agent's knowledge base K, i.e. K is inconsistent and thus does not allow any plausible conclusion. Hansson coined the term consolidation and defined it as an operation that withdraws parts of K in such a way that, first, the resulting knowledge base K is consistent and secondly, the change is as small as possible (Hansson, 1994) . Even earlier, Reiter introduced the presumably first formal treatment of this problem in his seminal paper (Reiter, 1987) . The so-called diagnostic problem for a given system arises whenever we observe that the system does not behave as it should. Reiter used first-order logic as representation formalism and his definition of a diagnosis contains the concepts of consistency as well as minimality. Since then the problem of restoring consistency under the requirement of minimal change has been considered for many other formalisms like situation calculus (Mcilraith, 1999) , logic programs (Sakama & Inoue, 2003) , description logic including non-monotonic versions (Lembo, Lenzerini, Rosati, Ruzzi, & Savo, 2011; Bienvenu, 2012; Eiter, Fink, & Stepanova, 2013) as well as probabilistic conditional logic (Potyka & Thimm, 2014) to mention a few.
In this paper we focus on the non-monotonic theory of abstract argumentation (Dung, 1995) . More precisely, we consider an abstract argumentation framework (AF) as an agent's knowledge base and the associated extensions correspond to her beliefs (cf. (Coste-Marquis, Konieczny, Mailly, & Marquis, 2014; Nouioua & Würbel, 2014; Diller, Haret, Linsbichler, Rümmele, & Woltran, 2018) for similar approaches). In brief, Dung-style AFs consist of arguments and attacks which are treated as primitives, i.e., the internal structure of arguments is not considered. The major focus is on resolving conflicts. To this end a variety of semantics have been defined, each of them specifying acceptable sets of arguments, so-called extensions, in a particular way.
The starting point of our study is a semantical defect of an agent's AF which prevents her from drawing any plausible conclusion in the sense that nothing is accepted. Our aim is to obtain an agent which is able to act. Therefore we want to know what are minimal diagnoses of the given knowledge base, i.e., which parts are causing the semantical defect. The knowledge about these diagnoses may make it easier to decide what to do next. For instance, a certain minimal diagnosis may consist of arguments which are somehow out of date in comparison to the others. Consequently, one may tend to discard these arguments. This is why our repair approach focusses on removal of certain arguments. todo: still true? attack deletion In general, it is easily conceivable that one may create a certain internal hierarchy over the stored arguments encoding the willingness to drop them. For instance, let us assume that dropping either the argument A 1 or the argument A 2 represent minimal repairs. Let us further assume that A 1 represents "Do not drive over the lawn, because this would destroy the lawn." and A 2 stands for "Drive over the lawn, whenever you may save lifes with this action." In this situation it might be reasonable to drop A1.
Let us consider an abstract example under the most prominent semantics, namely the stable one. Informally, a set of arguments is a stable extensions if there are no conflicts between them and moreover, all other arguments are attacked by at least one argument of the set. The main aim is to study such semantical defects with regard to the following naturally arising questions/tasks: 1. Diagnosis -Which sets of arguments are causing the collapse? 2. Properties -Do diagnoses always exist? Are there certain preferred diagnoses? How computationally costly is it to verify a candidate diagnosis?
3. Computation -How to compute one/all diagnoses?
4. Repair -How to use this information to obtain an agent which is indeed able to act? Example 1.2 (Diagnosis and Repair). One may argue that the arguments e and f together can be seen as a diagnosis for the semantical defect of F since ignoring these arguments and their corresponding attacks result in a meaningful AF denoted by F {e,f } . In particular, stb F {e,f } = {{d, b}}. Note that neither of both arguments can be omitted since the resulting frameworks would collapse too. In this sense, the presented diagnosis {e, f } and the corresponding repair F {e,f } are minimal.
The main results of the paper are as follows: After discussing necessary preliminaries for abstract argumentation in Section 2 we tackle the second question in Section 4, namely: How to systematically find all minimal diagnoses of a given AF under a given semantics. In particular, we will see that the considered AF F indeed possesses further minimal repairs. These formal results are mainly due to the well-known hitting set duality first introduced in (Reiter, 1987) and a recently generalized version of it (Brewka, Thimm, & Ulbricht, 2017) . In the subsequent Section 3 we consider the question of existence of minimal diagnoses and we provide relations between diagnoses wrt. different semantics. Grounded semantics plays a central role here since its minimal diagnoses represent bounds for diagnosis of other semantics. We also briefly discuss subclasses of AFs, namely symmetric, compact and acyclic frameworks. Afterwards, we study the computational complexity for the associated existence and verification problem. In the subsequent Section 7 we briefly discuss repair strategies for stable and preferred semantics. Finally, we conclude as well as discuss some related work in Section 8. In almost all cases we provide full proofs. If not available we included some short comments indicating how to prove the statement in question.
A preliminary version (Baumann & Ulbricht, 2018) of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning.
Background in Abstract Argumentation
In the original formulation (Dung, 1995) , an abstract argumentation framework is a directed graph F = (A, R) where nodes in A represent arguments and the relation R models attack, i.e., for a, b ∈ A, if (a, b) ∈ R we say that a attacks b or a is an attacker of b. We say that F is self-controversial if any argument attacks itself. If not stated otherwise, we restrict ourselves to non-empty finite AFs (cf. (Baumann & Spanring, 2015 for a treatment of unrestricted AFs). Formally, we introduce an infinite reference set U, so-called universe of arguments and require for any possible AF, A ⊆ U. The collection of all possible AFs is abbreviated by F. Moreover, for a set E we use E + for {b | (a, b) ∈ R, a ∈ E } and define E ⊕ = E ∪ E + . In case we need to be specific about the AF under consideration, we use the more informativ notation E ⊕ F . A further essential notion in argumentation is defense. More precisely, an argument b is defended by a set A if each attacker of b is counter-attacked by some a ∈ A. Then, the characteristic function of the AF F is given via Γ F : 2 A → 2 A with E → {a ∈ A | a is defended by E}.
An extension-based semantics σ : F → 2 2 U is a function which assigns to any AF F = (A, R) a set of sets of arguments σ(F ) ⊆ 2 A . Each one of them, so-called σ-extension, is considered to be acceptable with respect to F . Besides conflict-free and admissible sets (abbr. cf and ad ) we consider stage, stable, semi-stable, complete, preferred, grounded, idealproperties, 9. E ∈ eg(F ) iff E ∈ co(F ) and E ⊆ ss(F ) and ⊆-maximal wrt. the conjunction of both properties.
We say that a semantics σ is universally defined if σ(F ) = ∅ for any F ∈ F. If even |σ(F )| = 1 we say that σ is uniquely defined. All semantics apart from stable one are universally defined. In addition, grounded, ideal and eager semantics are examples of uniquely defined semantics. Stable semantics may collapse, i.e. there are AFs F , s.t. stb(F ) = ∅ (cf. running example F depicted in Example 1.1). For two semantics σ and τ we write σ ⊆ τ if for any AF F , σ(F ) ⊆ τ (F ). For instance, it is well-known that stb ⊆ ss ⊆ pr ⊆ co ⊆ ad ⊆ cf .
In the present article we are interested in situations where a given AF F = (A, R) does not possess accepted arguments. To make the notion of acceptance precise, we utilize the usual two alternative reasoning modes, namely credulous as well as sceptical acceptance. Note that we require σ(F ) to be non-empty for sceptical reasoning in order to avoid the (for our purpose) unintended situation that every argument is sceptically accepted due to technical reasons. Set-theoretically the intersection over the empty family of sets would yield any argument (cf. (Baumann & Spanring, 2015 , Section 2) for more information). However, in our setting it makes sense to define it as the empty set since the (sceptical or credulous) acceptance of an argument a should imply the existence of at least one set containing a.
Definition 2.2. Given a semantics σ, an AF F = (A, R) and an argument a ∈ A. We say that a is 1. credulously accepted wrt. σ if a ∈ σ(F ), 2. sceptically accepted wrt. σ if a ∈ σ(F ) and σ(F ) = ∅.
As already mentioned, our motivation for a concept of inconsistency is a semantical defect of an agent's AF which prevents her from drawing any plausible conclusion in the sense that nothing is accepted. This is clearly not only relevent for credulous reasoning (at least one extension is non-empty), but also sceptical reasoning (there are undisputed arguments). Since we require σ(F ) = ∅ for sceptical acceptence, we naturally obtain the following notion of inconsistent argumentation frameworks.
Definition 2.3. Given a semantics σ, an AF F = (A, R). We say that F is 1. inconsistent wrt. credulous reasoning and σ if σ(F ) = ∅, 2. inconsistent wrt. sceptical reasoning and σ if σ(F ) = ∅ where we let ∅ = ∅.
We omit the specifications "wrt. credulous reasoning" and/or "wrt. σ" whenever the reasoning mode, the semantics or both are implicitly clear or do not matter.
Having established this background including our notion of inconsistent AFs we are now ready to tackle the problem of repairing AFs via moving to an appropriate subframework. In the following section, we will discuss different notions of repairs, whether they exists and connections between them.
On the Existence of Repairs
Clearly, before computing potential repairs one may wonder what types of repairs exist and whether there are minimal diagnoses at all. In this section we provide the formal notions and results wrt. this problem and in particular, we give an affirmative answer for nearly all considerable cases. We also investigate the relationship between different repairs. Unfortunately, the existence of a least repair is not guaranteed which leads to follow-up question of how to repair? which will be considered in the subsequent section.
Notions for Repairs
Our repair approach involves moving to subgraphs of a given AF. So let us start by introducing the required notions and formalizing the concepts of diagnoses and repairs. So let F = (A, R) be an AF. For a given set S ⊆ A of arguments we use F S or sometimes F \ S todo: Letzteres bitte nicht mehr verwenden as a shorthand for the restriction of F to the set A \ S, i. e.,
In other words, for S ⊆ A, F S is the subframework of F induced by the removal of arguments in S. Analogously, for a given set S ⊆ R of attacks we use F S or sometimes F \ S as a shorthand for (A, R \ S). We will also sometimes abuse notation and write F ∪ {a} and F ∪ {(a, b)} instead of F ∪ ({a}, ∅) and F ∪ ({a, b}, {(a, b)}), respectively. As usual, the latter unions are understood pointwise. Consider the following frameworks. Example 3.1. Recall the AF F from Example 1.1, i. e., F = (A, R) with
Let S = {d} ⊆ A. Then,
The AFs F {d} and F {(a,b)} are depicted in Figure 1 (1) and (2), respectively.
Following the usual notions of "repairs" and "diagnoses" of knowledge bases we define them for abstract argumentation setting: Definition 3.2. Given a semantics σ and an AF F . We call S ⊆ A (S ⊆ R) an argumentbased (attack-based ) σ-cred-diagnosis of F iff F S is consistent wrt. credulous reasoning. Moreover, we call the AF F S an argument-based (attack-based ) σ-cred-repair of F . We use the terms minimal and least for ⊆-minimal or ⊆-least σ-diagnosis as well as the associated σ-repairs. We define (minimal, least) σ-scep-diagnoses and σ-scep-repairs analogously.
If clear from context or unimportant we drop the considered semantics and/or reasoning mode.
Example 3.3. Again consider F and S from Example 3.1, i. e., F = (A, R) with
and S, S with S = {d} and S = {(a, b)}. Let σ = stb. We see that F S possesses no stable extension due to the (still existing) odd loop. Thus, S is no stb-diagnosis of F . However, S is a stb-diagnosis, since F S possesses the unique stable extension {a, b, e, f }. So, F S is a stb-repair. Since only one attack is removed, it is quite easy to see that S is even a minimal diagnosis.
Relations between Credulous and Sceptical Reasoning Mode
We start with some general relations between credulous and sceptical diagnoses. The following theorem applies to any semantics. It states that minimal credulous diagnoses can be found as subsets of sceptical diagnoses.
Theorem 3.4. Given an AF F and a semantics σ. If S is a scep-σ-diagnosis of F , then there is a minimal cred-σ-diagnosis S of F , s.t. S ⊆ S.
Proof. Let S be a scep-σ-diagnosis of F . This means, σ(F S ) = ∅. Consequently, σ(F S ) = ∅ and therefore σ(F S ) = ∅. Thus, S is a cred-σ-diagnosis of F . Moreover, by finiteness of S we deduce the existence of a minimal cred-σ-diagnosis S of F with S ⊆ S concluding the proof.
Observe that the above theorem holds for both argument-based as well as attack-based diagnoses.
Vice Versa, sceptical diagnoses can be found as supersets of credulous ones. We want to mention two issues. First, in contrast to the assertion before, the proof of Theorem 3.5 requires semantics specific properties and thus, does not hold for any argumentation semantics. Secondly, it is not quite clear whether even minimality can be shown. More precisely, the situation differs depending on the semantics and whether argument-based or attack-based diagnoses are considered. Let us start with the existence of an arbitrary repair:
Theorem 3.5. Given an AF F and a semantics σ ∈ {stb, ss, co, pr , gr , il , eg}. If S is a cred-σ-diagnosis of F , then there is a scep-σ-diagnosis S of F , s.t. S ⊆ S . Proof. We give two different proofs depending on whether S is argument-or attack-based. Argument-based : We argue as in the proof of Theorem 3.5: Assume S is a cred-σ-diagnosis of F . Then, there is an argument a ∈ σ(F S ) = ∅. Since a σ-extension is conflictfree, (a, a) / ∈ F S . So define S = (A \ {a}, ∅) yielding F S = ({a}, ∅). Thus, we obtain σ(F S ) = {{a}} for any semantics σ. Hence, σ(F S ) = {a} proving that S is a scep-σ-diagnosis of F . Attack-based : This is trivial because S = R yields an AF with no attacks, so σ(F S ) = {A} for any considered semantics σ. Moreover, S ⊆ S for any attack-based diagnosis S. Now we turn to minimality, i. e., the following problem: Given an AF F , a semantics σ ∈ {stb, ss, co, pr , gr , il , eg} and a minimal cred-σ-diagnosis S of F , is there a minimal scep-σ-diagnosis S of F , s.t. S ⊆ S ? Let us first mention the trivial cases σ ∈ {gr , eg, il } where the reasoning modes (due to uniqueness) coincide. Clearly, minimality is given as noted in Corollary 3.13. For the other semantics the answer differs depending on the typ of diagnoses under consideration. So let us start with argument-based ones. Here we have the following counterexample for σ ∈ {ss, co, pr }. Please observe the structure of this AF: We have an even loop consisting of arguments a, b, c and d which is disturbed by two dummy arguments x and y. Let σ ∈ {ss, pr , co}. Clearly, there is no way to defend anything from x and y and thus ∅ is the only σ-extension. Hence, F is inconsistent wrt. σ. Now consider the AF F {x} , i. e., the argument x is removed. We still have ∅ as the only extension: The two candidates {a, d} and {b, c} still lack defense against y. However, removal of x and y yields the following AF F {x,y} possessing the two non-empty extensions {a, d} and {b, c}:
We thus found the minimal σ-cred diagnosis {x, y}. In order to extend this diagnosis to a σ-scep diagnosis, we need to remove a, b, c or d as well, so we have σ-scep diagnoses {x, y, a}, {x, y, b}, {x, y, c} and {x, y, d} and there corresponding repairs as depicted below:
However, there is no minimal σ-scep diagnosis among them. For example, in F {x,y,a} the argument a is removed in order to render c sceptically accepted. This, in turn, does not depend on x, so there is no harm in moving to F {y,a} instead; c is still sceptically accepted:
Due to symmetry, we see in addition the minimal σ-scep-diagnoses {y, c}, {x, b} and {x, d}. There is thus no minimal σ-scep-diagnosis S with {x, y} ⊆ S . todo: Großartig! Sehr schönes Beispiel For stable semantics, this is an open problem. We conjecture that minimality can be guaranteed, but did not find a proof so far.
Conjecture 3.7. Let F be an AF. If S is a minimal argument-based stb-cred-diagnosis of F , then there is a minimal stb-scep-diagnosis S of F , s.t. S ⊆ S .
Let us now turn to attack-based diagnoses. They are more fine-grained since removing a single attack is just removing an attack, where removing an argument yields an arbitrary amount of removed attacks. We can thus answer the question affirmatively for preferred, stable and semi-stable semantics. We have the following, even stronger result. The proof of the theorem below illustrates how precise attack-based diagnoses operate: Given (a, b) ∈ S for a minimal σ-diagnosis (σ ∈ {ss, pr , stb}), then b is guaranteed to be sceptically accepted.
Theorem 3.8. Let F = (A, R) be an AF and let σ ∈ {ss, pr , stb}. Assume F is inconsistent wrt. σ and credulous reasoning. If S ⊆ R is a minimal σ-cred-diagnosis of F , then S is a minimal σ-scep-diagnosis as well.
Proof. Let (a, b) ∈ S. By assumption, F S ∪ {(a, b)} = F S\{(a,b)} is inconsistent wrt. σ and credulous reasoning and F S is consistent, i. e., there is a non-empty extension ∅ = E ∈ σ(F S ). We claim that b is sceptically accepted in F S . Stable: Let E be a stable extension of F S . By definition, E ⊕ F S = A and E is conflict-free in F S . Assume for the sake of contradiction b / ∈ E. We claim that in this case, E must be a stable extension of F S ∪ {(a, b)} as well:
• Since E was conflict-free in F S and b / ∈ E, E is also conflict-free in F S ∪ {(a, b)},
} since the other inclusion is clear. The two items above are the properties a stable extension requires. Now, since E is a stable extension of F S ∪ {(a, b)}, we see that S is not a minimal stb-cred-diagnosis of F contradicting our assumption. We thus conclude b ∈ E. Since E was an arbitrary σ-extension of F S , b is sceptically accepted. We thus infer that S is even a stb-scep-diagnosis. Minimality will be discussed below.
todo: checked! Preferred: Now let E be a non-empty preferred extension of F S . Hence E = Γ F S (E) with E = ∅. Again assume b / ∈ E. In this case, b is not defended by E, otherwise we had b ∈ Γ F S (E). This means, there is an argument c ∈ A with (c, b) ∈ R \ S (hence, c = a) with either c ∈ E or c is not attacked by E. Now consider F S ∪ {(a, b)}. Since b / ∈ E, E is still conflict-free. Moreover, there is the argument c as above, so we have b / ∈ Γ F S ∪{(a,b)} (E) as well. This means the additional attack (a, b) is irrelevant for the characteristic function Γ applied to E, i. e.,
and hence, E = ∅ is a complete extension of F S ∪ {(a, b)}. Thus, F S ∪ {(a, b)} is consistent wrt. complete semantics and credulous reasoning, implying it is consistent wrt. preferred semantics and credulous reasoning. As above, this contradicts minimality of S. We thus conclude b ∈ E for any non-empty preferred extension E. Since there is at least one nonempty preferred extension, ∅ / ∈ pr (F S ) and we thus see again that b is sceptically accepted.
todo: checked! Semi-Stable: As before, assume we are given an non-empty semi-stable extension E of F S with b / ∈ E. We may argue as above since E is also a preferred extension of F S . We thus infer that E is a complete extension of F S ∪ {(a, b)}. This is the same contradiction as before, implying b ∈ E. Again, E was an arbitrary non-empty extension and ∅ / ∈ ss(F S ), so b is sceptically accepted.
todo: checked! Minimality: In all three cases we observed that S is a σ-cred-diagnosis as well. As a final remark we note that S must be minimal since S was assumed to be minimal for credulous reasoning already. More precisely a proper subset S S cannot be a σ-scep-diagnosis which can be seen as in the proof of Theorem 3.4.
Observe that inconsistency of F wrt. credulous reasoning was a premise of the above theorem. In case F possesses a non-empty σ-extension, it is clear that a minimal σ-scepdiagnosis can be found as a superset of the single minimal σ-cred-diagnosis ∅. So we summarize:
Corollary 3.9. Let F be an AF and let σ ∈ {ss, pr , stb}. If S is a minimal attack-based σ-cred-diagnosis of F , then there is a minimal σ-scep-diagnosis S of F , s.t. S ⊆ S .
Proof. If F is consistent wrt. σ and credulous reasoning, then S must be empty, so the claim is trivial. Otherwise, if S is a minimal attack-based σ-cred-diagnosis of F , then due to Theorem 3.8 we may set S = S, i. e., we can even guarantee equality.
When considering complete semantics, we do not have minimality in Theorem 3.5 in general. At a first glance, this might be surprising considering the affirmative answer for preferred semantics. However, in the proof of Theorem 3.8 we could exclude ∅ as a possible preferred extension once we found an arbitrary non-empty fixed point of Γ. This does not work for complete semantics. Hence, we find the following counterexample: Clearly, ∅ is the only complete extension. The reader may verify that S = {(w, a), (z, d)} is a minimal co-cred-diagnosis of F , yielding the complete extension {a, d}. Since ∅ is a complete extension of F S as well, this is no co-scep-diagnosis of F . One may check that S cannot be extended to a minimal sceptical diagnosis: A minimal co-scep-diagnosis must ensure that at least one argument is unattacked. Thus, they are given as {(w, w)}, . . . , {(z, z)} and
So there is no minimal co-scep-diagnoses S with S ⊆ S .
Finally, we show two helpful, but not unexpected relations between different semantics and their reasoning modes.
Theorem 3.11. Given two semantics σ and τ , s.t. σ ⊆ τ and σ is universally defined. Let F be an AF.
Proof. We prove the second item only. Let S be a scep-τ -diagnosis of F . This means,
Since σ is universally defined we have σ(F S ) = ∅ which implies that S is a scep-σ-diagnosis of F . Moreover, by finiteness of S we deduce the existence of a minimal scep-σ-diagnosis S of F with S ⊆ S concluding the proof.
Uniquely Defined Semantics
We now focus on uniquely defined semantics, i. e., we have |σ(F )| = 1 for any F ∈ F. Considering the semantics we investigate in this paper this means σ ∈ {gr , eg, il }.
Please note that in case of uniquely defined semantics we have that any (minimal) sceptical diagnosis is a (minimal) credulous one and vice versa.
Lemma 3.12. If F is an AF and σ ∈ {gr , eg, il }, then S is a cred-σ-diagnosis of F iff it is a scep-σ-diagnosis of F .
This implies in particular that minimality in Theorem 3.5 can be shown.
Corollary 3.13. Given an AF F and a semantics σ ∈ {gr , eg, il }. If S is a minimal cred-σ-diagnosis of F , then there is a minimal scep-σ-diagnosis S of F , s.t. S ⊆ S .
Proof. Set S = S and apply Lemma 3.12.
We proceed with grounded semantics since these results will play a central role for all other semantics considered in this paper. Dung originally defined the grounded extension of an AF F = (A, R) as the ⊆-least fixpoint of the so-called characteristic function Γ F : 2 A → 2 A with E → {a ∈ A | a is defended by E}. Moreover, he showed that this definition coincides with the ⊆-least complete extension (Dung, 1995, Theorem 25) as introduced in Definition 2.1. Since Γ F is shown to be ⊆-monotonic we may compute the unique grounded extension G stepwise, i.e., applying Γ F iteratively starting from the empty set. More precisely, (Baumann & Spanring, 2017 , Section 3.2)). For instance, the unique grounded extensions of F {c} and F {a} are {e, f, a} = Γ 2 F {c} (∅) and {e, f, b} = Γ 1 F {a} (∅), respectively. Consequently, an AF possesses a non-empty grounded extension if and only if there exists at least one unattacked argument. This renders argumentbased diagnoses weaker in some cases since there is no way to remove a single argument. It is thus clear that a self-controversial AF does not possess an argument-based diagnosis. More precisely, we find the following:
Fact 3.14. Let σ = gr . Let F be an AF.
1. There exists a minimal argument-based gr -repair for F iff F is not self-controversial.
2. There exists a minimal attack-based gr -repair for F .
Proof. For the first item, assume F = (A, R) and a ∈ A does not attack itself. Then, S = A \ {a} is a gr -diagnosis of F . Due to finiteness, we find a minimal one S with S ⊆ S. For the second item observe that S = R is a diagnosis. Again we can move to a minimal one.
todo: Was soll man da noch sagen? Einfach toll! In addition to Fact 3.14, we observe that diagnoses for ideal and eager semantics can be found as subsets of a grounded diagnosis. The intuitive reason is the fact that ideal semantics accepts more arguments than grounded semantics and eager semantics is even more credulous than ideal semantics.
Lemma 3.15. Let σ ∈ {il , eg}. Let F be an AF. If S is a gr -diagnosis of F , then there is a minimal σ-diagnosis S of F , s.t. S ⊆ S .
Proof. As already mentioned, S is a gr -diagnosis of F if and only if F S contains an unattacked argument, say a. In this case we see that a also occurs in the unique ideal as well as eager extension. Hence, S is a σ-diagnosis for σ ∈ {il , eg}. Due to finiteness, there is a minimal σ-diagnosis S with S ⊆ S .
The subsequent main theorem claims the existence of minimal σ-diagnoses for the considered uniquely defined semantics (recall that we do not need to distinguish between credulous and sceptical reasoning for those semantics). Due to the above fact, we find the claim for grounded semantics. Equipped with a grounded diagnosis, we find the other two by applying Lemma 3.15. Moreover, the restriction to finite AFs even gives us the existence of minimal ones.
Theorem 3.16. Let σ ∈ {gr , eg, il }. Let F be an AF.
1. There exists a minimal argument-based σ-repair for F iff F is not self-controversial.
2. There exists a minimal attack-based σ-repair for F .
Proof. For σ = gr , this is Fact 3.14. For σ ∈ {eg, il }, this can be inferred from Lemma 3.15 after applying Fact 3.14.
Example 3.17. The following simple framework G demonstrates that least σ-repairs do not necessarily exist. For σ ∈ {gr , eg, il } we have σ(G) = {∅}, i.e. nothing is credulously/sceptically accepted.
Observe that all four depicted given diagnoses are minimal, i. e., {a}, {b}, {(a, b)} and {(b, a)}. This example thus illustrates that a least repair does not necessarily exist. This is true for both argument-based as well as attack-based diagnoses.
This finishes our discussion on uniquely defined semantics. In the subsequent section, we turn to universally defined semantics.
Universally Defined Semantics
Let us consider now semantics which provide us with at least one acceptable position. The following lemma shows that for these semantics minimal credulous as well as sceptical diagnoses are guaranteed, whenever there is a grounded diagnosis.
Lemma 3.18. Let σ ∈ {ss, pr , co}. For any AF F there exists a minimal σ-diagnosis S, whenever there exists a gr -diagnosis S of F . Moreover, even S ⊆ S can be guaranteed.
Proof. Let σ ∈ {ss, pr , co} and S a gr -diagnosis of F . Hence, gr (F S ) = {G} with G = ∅. Since G is the ⊆-least fixpoint of Γ F S we deduce G ⊆ C for any C ∈ co(F S ). Due to ss ⊆ pr ⊆ co and the universal definedness of σ we have ∅ = G ⊆ σ(F S ) as well as ∅ = G ⊆ σ(F S ). Hence, S is a sceptical as well as credulous σ-diagnosis of F . Due to finiteness of F , there exists a minimal σ-diagnosis S ⊆ S concluding the proof.
Combining Theorem 3.16 and Lemma 3.18 yields the subsequent main theorem for the considered universally defined semantics. As usual, there is a slight difference between argument-based and attack-based diagnoses.
Theorem 3.19. Let σ ∈ {ss, pr , co}. Let F be an AF.
Proof. Apply Theorem 3.16 and Lemma 3.18.
The following example shows, as promised in Lemma 3.18, that already computed grounded diagnoses can be used to find minimal preferred diagnoses. Moreover, in contrast to uniquely defined semantics we observe that minimal sceptical and minimal credulous diagnoses do not necessarily coincide. This is the case for both argument-based and attack-based diagnoses.
Example 3.20. Consider the following AF L. Since we have no unattacked arguments we deduce gr (L) = {∅}, i.e., nothing is accepted. Argument-based repairs: Please observe that L {a} and L {d} do not possess a grounded extension, either. Consequently, L {a,d} is a minimal argument-based gr -repair since gr (L {a,d} ) = {{c}}. Note that {a, d} is even a sceptical as well credulous preferred diagnosis of L. These diagnoses are not minimal for preferred semantics since pr (L) = {{a, d}, {c}} implies pr (L) = ∅ as well as pr (L {a} ) = {{c}} entails pr (L {a} ) = ∅. Altogether, we have strict subset relation (∅ {a} {a, d}) between minimal credulous preferred, minimal sceptical preferred and minimal grounded diagnoses.
Attack-based reparis: Regarding attack-based diagnoses, we make similar observations with
Collapsing Semantics
Stable semantics is the only prominent semantics which may collapse even for finite AFs. Consider e. g. the AF F from Example 1.1, which does not possess a stable extension as we already explained. However, in terms of existence of repairs we do not observe any differences to all other considered semantics.
Fact 3.21. Let F be an AF.
1. There exists a minimal argument-based stb-repair for F iff F is not self-controversial.
2. There exists a minimal attack-based stb-repair for F .
In contrast to all other considered semantics we have that stable diagnoses can not be necessarily found as subsets of an already computed grounded one (Lemmata 3.15, 3.18).
For instance, the AF F from Example 1.1 possesses the unique grounded extension {e, f }. Consequently, we have the trivial (least) gr -diagnosis, namely the empty set. As F does not possess a stable extension, all minimal stb-diagnoses are non-empty. Nevertheless, credulous as well as sceptical diagnoses for stable semantics can be found as supersets of grounded ones.
Lemma 3.22. Let F = (A, R) be an AF. If S is a gr -diagnosis of F , then there is a stb-diagnosis S of F , s.t. S ⊆ S.
Proof. Argument-based : Given S as gr -diagnosis of F = (A, R), i.e. gr (F S ) = {E} with E = ∅. Consider now E ⊕ wrt. the attack-relation of F S . Obviously, S ⊆ A \ E ⊕ and moreover, gr F A\E ⊕ = {E}. Obviously, by construction E ∈ stb F A\E ⊕ . Furthermore, since E is non-empty we deduce that there is at least one unattacked argument a ∈ E. Hence, for any E ∈ stb F A\E ⊕ we have a ∈ E . Consequently, A \ E ⊕ serves as a credulous as well as sceptical diagnosis for stable semantics. Attack-based : Trivial since we may set S = R.
Please note that Lemma 3.22 does not claim minimality of the stb-diagnosis S. Indeed, the following example illustrates that existence of a minimal stb-diagnosis with S ⊆ S as above is not obtained in general. Since every argument is attacked we infer that ∅ cannot be a gr -diagnosis. A possible gr -diagnosis is {a}. Indeed, this is also a stb-diagnosis (wrt. credulous as well as sceptical reasoning), but not minimal since F itself possesses the sceptically accepted argument d. Moreover we make the same observations for the gr -diagnosis {(a, b)}. Hence, this is a counterexample for both types of diagnoses. This finishes our discussion regarding rather general results pertaining to the existence and relationships of repairs. In the next section, we show how to characterize all repairs of a given AF. This is achieved via a generalized version of Reiter's well-known hitting set duality.
Characterizing all Diangoses: A Hitting Set Duality for AFs
In his seminal paper (Reiter, 1987) , Reiter establishes -for his setting of a given system description -a duality result between the set of all minimal repairs and the minimal conflicts. Recently, it was shown (Brewka, Thimm, & Ulbricht, 2019 ) that Reiter's duality can be generalized to arbitrary logics given that the knowledge bases in question can be modeled as finite set of formulas. In order to capture even non-monotonic logics a refinement of the notion of inconsistency was necessary. In this section we will demonstrate how to utilize this generalized duality for the non-monotonic theory of abstract argumentation.
Hitting Set Duality for General Logics
For the result in a generic definition of a logic is used, adapted from (Brewka & Eiter, 2007) . In a nutshell, a logic L consists of syntax and semantics of formulas. To model the syntax properly, we stipulate a set WF of so-called well-formed formulas. Any knowledge base K consists of a subset of WF. To model the semantics, we let BS be a set of so-called belief sets. Intuitively, given a knowledge base K, the set of all that can be inferred from K is B ⊆ BS. To formalize this, a mapping ACC assigns the set B of corresponding belief sets to each knowledge base K. Finally, some belief sets are considered inconsistent. We call the set of all inconsistent belief sets IN C. Hence, our definition of a logic is as follows.
where WF is a set of well-formed formulas, BS is the set of belief sets, IN C ⊆ BS is an upward closed 1 set of inconsistent belief sets, and ACC :
Let us briefly discuss the notion of strong inconsistency and how it induces a hitting set duality for our setting.
We proceed with the well-known concepts of (minimal) hitting sets and (maximal) consistent subsets.
Definition 4.3. Let M be a set of sets. We call S a hitting set of M if S ∩ M = ∅ for each M ∈ M. A hitting set S of M is a minimal hitting set of M if S S implies S is not a hitting set of M.
Definition 4.4. We say H ⊆ K is a maximal consistent subset of K if H is consistent and H ⊆ H ⊆ K implies H is inconsistent. We denote the set of all maximal consistent subsets of K by C max (K). Now we are ready to phrase the duality result from (Brewka et al., 2017) .
Theorem 4.5. Let K be a knowledge base. Then, S is a minimal hitting set of SI min (K) if and only if K \ S ∈ C max (K).
For a more detailed discussion of this result see .
Inconsistent Argumentation
Our goal is to apply Theorem 4.5 to the theory of abstract argumentation frameworks. So let us rephrase the notions we require appropriately. Clearly, the concept of maximal consistency does not require a translation to AFs since this are the sub-AFs corresponding to minimal repairs. We thus consider strong inconsistency. As usual, this can be done for argument-based and attack-based diagnoses.
Definition 4.6. Let F = (A, R) be an AF and let σ be any semantics. Argument-based : We call H ⊆ A a strongly inconsistent set of arguments of F wrt. σ and credulous (sceptical) reasoning if of for each H with H ⊆ H ⊆ A the AF F A\H = (H , R |H ) is inconsistent wrt. σ and credulous (sceptical) reasoning. Let SI A min (F , σ, cred) (SI A min (F , σ, scep)) be the set of all minimal strongly inconsistent sets of arguments of F wrt. σ and credulous (sceptical) reasoning. Attack-based : We call H ⊆ R a strongly inconsistent set of attacks of F wrt. σ and credulous (sceptical) reasoning if for each H with H ⊆ H ⊆ R the AF F R\H = (A, H ) is inconsistent wrt. σ and credulous (sceptical) reasoning. Let SI R min (F , σ, cred) (SI R min (F , σ, scep)) be the set of all minimal strongly inconsistent sets of attacks of F wrt. σ and credulous (sceptical) reasoning.
As usual the semantics as well as the reasoning mode will sometimes be clear from the context or irrelevant. In this case we will leave σ as well as the reasoning mode implicit and simply write SI A min (F ) resp. SI R min (F ). Example 4.7 (Strong inconsistency for AFs). Consider the running example F . Argument-based : For our running example AF F = (A, R) we had A = {a, b, c, d, e, f }. Let us focus on credulous reasoning. We already observed that F has no stable extension, i.e., A itself is a strongly inconsistent set of arguments wrt. stable semantics. The subset , a) ) corresponding to the odd circle contained in F . However, H 1 is not a strongly inconsistent set of arguments since the framework induced by H 2 with H 1 ⊆ H 2 ⊆ A given as H 2 = {a, b, c, d} has the stable extension {b, d} (cf. AF F {e,f } depicted in Example 1.2). One may easily verify that
Again consider credulous reasoning and stable semantics. Now the subset H 1 ⊆ R with H 1 = {(a, b), (b, c), (c, a)} induces to the odd circle contained in F . Again, H 1 is not strongly inconsistent since the superset H 2 with
)} with the stable extension {b, d, e, f }. Note however that the represented framework is now different, namely F with two attacks removed:
We obtain
Now we are ready to apply Theorem 4.5 to diagnoses of AFs. The result holds for all semantics and both reasoning modes. It can be stated for both argument-based as well as attack-based repairs. To prove this, we simply construct a logic where any formula α of a knowledge base K corresponds to an argument (for argument-based diagnoses) resp. attack (for attack-based diagnoses). Since an AF is a tuple consisting of both arguments and attacks, one of them will be fixed. This appears to yield clumsy logics, but suffices to prove our results.
Proposition 4.8. [Duality: argument-based] Let F = (A, R) be an AF. Let σ be any semantics and consider any reasoning mode. Then, S is a minimal hitting set of SI A min (F ) if and only if S is a minimal σ-diagnosis of F .
Proof. Assume the set R of attacks is fixed. Define a logic L = (WF, BS, IN C, ACC) with WF = A (that is, a knowledge base K is a finite set of arguments in A), BS = A, IN C = ∅ and ACC(K) = σ(F ) resp. ACC(K) = σ(F ) where F is the AF F = (K, R |K ). Now given an AF F = (A, R) a minimal argument-based repair corresponds to a maximal consistent subset H ⊆ K = A and a minimal strongly inconsistent set of arguments of F corresponds to a minimal strongly inconsistent subset of K. Thus, the claim can be seen by applying Theorem 4.5 to the logic L we defined here.
Proposition 4.9. [Duality: attack-based] Let F = (A, R) be an AF. Let σ be any semantics and consider any reasoning mode. Then, S is a minimal hitting set of SI R min (F ) if and only if S is a minimal σ-diagnosis of F .
Proof. Assume the set A of arguments is fixed. Define a logic L = (WF, BS, IN C, ACC) with WF = A × A (that is, a knowledge base K is a finite set of attacks over A), BS = A, IN C = ∅ and ACC(K) = σ(F ) resp. ACC(K) = σ(F ) where F is the AF F = (A, K). Now given an AF F = (A, R) a minimal attack-based repair corresponds to a maximal consistent subset H ⊆ K = R and a minimal strongly inconsistent set of attacks of F corresponds to a minimal strongly inconsistent subset of K. Thus, the claim can be seen by applying Theorem 4.5 to the logic L we defined here. According to Definition 4.3 we obtain four minimal hitting sets, namely {a}, {b}, {c} and {e, f }. Observe that {e, f } is the already found stb-diagnosis presented in Example 1.2. The minimal hitting sets for F can be interpreted as follows: Either one argument from the odd circle needs to be removed or both e and f to facilitate d. These sets correspond to the stb-repairs F {e,f } (considered in Example 1.2) as well as F {c} , F {b} and F {a} depicted below. We obtain stb F {c} = {{e, f, a}}, stb F {b} = {{e, f, c}} and stb F {a} = {{e, f, b}}. This finishes our discussion regarding a characterization of all diagnoses of a given AF. The results of this section indicate that finding repairs can be achieved in a straightforward way or by consideration of the strongly inconsistent arguments resp. attacks. This might not be the most efficient approach if one is just interested in one diagnosis, but it helps representing all repairs in a concise way. In the next section, we focus on particular aspects and properties of AFs in order to infer tailored, more advanced properties.
Special Cases For AFs
We may obtain more insightful results when focusing on certain aspects of the AF under consideration. We will start our investigation with symmetric AFs (Coste-Marquis, Devred, & Marquis, 2005) . In a nutshell, an AF is symmetric if the attack relation is. Symmetry is a rather strong property, yielding a variety of additional connections between repairs and diagnoses. Moreover, complexity results for symmetric AFs are quite encouraging (see Section 6 below). The same is true for compact (Baumann, Dvorák, Linsbichler, Strass, & Woltran, 2014 ) and acyclic AFs. We then continue with a splitting method introduced in (Baumann, 2011) . Splitting methods are an important concept in non-monotonic reasoning which allows for a certain modularization of the knowledge base under consideration which is usually not given due to non-monotonic interactions between formulas (see (Baroni, Giacomin, & Liao, 2018) for an excellent overview). The structural properties that come along with splitting can be utilized to infer results for diagnoses. The last part of this section will be devoted to infinite AFs (Baumann & Spanring, 2017) . Allowing the underlying set of arguments to be infinite possesses additional challenges since the behavior of an infinite AF is less intuitive and existence and uniqueness of certain extensions as well as diagnoses is no longer guaranteed.
Symmetric, Compact and Acyclic Frameworks
Let us start with so-called symmetric AFs. According to (Coste-Marquis et al., 2005) an AF F = (A, R) is symmetric if R is symmetric, nonempty and irreflexive.
Definition 5.1. If F = (A, R) is an AF, then we call F symmetric if
• (a, a) / ∈ R for any a ∈ A.
Example 5.2. The following AF F is symmetric:
Now assume we are given a symmetric AF F . Clearly, when moving from F to F S for S ⊆ A resp. S ⊆ R, we do not change the fact that the attack relation is irreflexive. We might end up with an AF with no attack (violating non-emptiness), but this does not concern us since an AF of the form F = (A, ∅) is consistent for both reasoning modes and any reasonable semantics; the only exception is σ = ad and sceptical reasoning. However, we need to make sure that the symmetry of the attack relation is preserved, otherwise we lose the properties we want to utilize. This is clearly no issue for argument-based diagnoses:
Lemma 5.3. If F = (A, R) is symmetric and S ⊆ A, then the attack-relation of F S is either empty or symmetric and irreflexive.
Of course, we want to consider attack-based diagnoses as well. Fortunately, the restriction we need to make to removal of attacks is quite natural. We simply need to ensure that the diagnosis operates symmetric in the sense that removal of (a, b) implies removal of (b, a) as well. Formally:
Clearly, we now have:
Lemma 5.5. If F = (A, R) is symmetric and S ⊆ R a symmetric diagnosis, then the attack relation of F S is either empty or symmetric.
In case of stable, semi-stable and preferred semantics we obtain a very useful property, namely any argument a ∈ A belongs to at least one extension (Coste-Marquis et al., 2005, Proposition 6 ). Consequently, we may show the following properties.
Proposition 5.6. Given a semantics σ ∈ {stb, ss, pr } and a symmetric AF F = (A, R).
1. ∅ is the least cred-σ-diagnosis and 2. S ⊆ F is a (minimal) symmetric scep-σ-diagnosis iff S is a (minimal) symmetric gr -diagnosis.
Let us assume that our current knowledge base underlies further external revision processes (cf. (Coste-Marquis et al., 2014; Baumann & Brewka, 2015; Diller et al., 2018) for belief revision in abstract argumentation). Both items can be gainfully used if we know that certain types of revision do not affect the symmetry of an AF. More precisely, the items 1 and 2 ensure that we have either nothing to do (if interested in credulous reasoning) or we may act according to grounded semantics instead of σ (if sceptical reasoning is chosen).
Example 5.7. Consider again the symmetric AF F from above:
We have stb(F ) = {{a, d}, {b, d}, {c}}. This means, no argument is sceptically accepted. In order to repair regarding grounded semantics we have to ensure the existence of at least one unattacked argument. Consequently, the least scep-gr -repair is given as F {c} . As promised by Item 2 in Proposition 5.6 this indeed coincides with the least scep-stb-repair.
Let us briefly consider two further classes of frameworks, namely so-called compact and acyclic ones. The first one is semantically defined and characterized by the feature that each argument of the AF occurs in at least one extension of the AF Baumann, 2018) . For instance, the AF F depicted in Example 5.2 is compact wrt. stable semantics. Compact frameworks obviously fulfill item 1 of Proposition 5.6 and thus build an interesting subclass of AFs if interested in credulous reasoning. The second class is syntactically defined and as expected an AF is acyclic if it does not contain any cycles. Such frameworks are known to be well-founded (Dung, 1995) which means, they possess exactly one complete extension which is grounded, preferred and stable (Coste-Marquis et al., 2005, Propositions 1 and 2). This means, the agent is able to act (in both reasoning modes) whenever we are faced with an acyclic AF.
Splitting
Let us now investigate situations where we are given a splitting of the AF under consideration. Splitting is an important concept in non-monotonic reasoning as it abuses structural properties of a knowledge base in order to identify a certain monotonic behavior. More precisely, splitting methods try to divide a theory in subtheories such that the formal semantics of the entire theory can be obtained by constructing the semantics of the subtheories. For AFs, splitting was considered in (Baumann, 2011 (Baumann, , 2014 . We briefly recall the required notions here and then demonstrate how to infer properties of repairs and diagnoses.
Definition 5.8. Let F 1 = (A 1 , R 1 ) and F 2 = (A 2 , R 2 ) be two AFs with
In a nutshell, if (F 1 , F 2 , R 3 ) is a splitting of F , then extensions of F 1 can be computed as a first step to compute an extensions of F . The AF F 2 does not influence F 1 and can thus be considered later.
Example 5.9. Let F 1 = (A 1 , R 1 ) with A 1 = {a, b} and R 1 = {(a, b), (b, a)}, F 2 = (A 2 , R 2 ) with A 2 = {c, d} and
is a splitting of the following AF:
The idea of splitting is as follows: Once we are given an extension E 1 of the AF F 1 , based on E 1 we want to construct a reduced version of F 2 . Then we compute an extension E 2 of this reduced AF to obtain an extension E 1 ∪ E 2 of F . In the following, we define how to reduce F 2 when considering stable semantics. The other semantics will be discussed afterwards.
Definition 5.10 (Reduct). Let F 2 = (A 2 , R 2 ) be an AF and A 1 such that
Example 5.11. Consider again our previous example. The AF F 1 = (A 1 , R 1 ) as above has two stable extensions E 1 = {a} and E 1 = {b}. So we are interested in the (E 1 , R 3 )-and (E 1 , R 3 )-reduct of F 2 which are F The former has the stable extension E 2 = {c}, the latter none. Indeed, the unique stable extension of the whole AF F is {a, c} = E 1 ∪ E 2 . Now the following theorem states that we can indeed find extensions E of F by considering an extension E 1 of F 1 and then reduce F 2 and continue computing. More precisely, we find all extensions of F this way:
Theorem 5.12. [ (Baumann, 2011) ] Let (F 1 , F 2 , R 3 ) be a splitting of the AF F = (A, R) = (A 1 ∪ A 2 , R 1 ∪ R 2 ∪ R 3 ) where F 1 = (A 1 , R 1 ) and F 2 = (A 2 , R 2 ).
• If E 1 is a stable extension of F 1 and E 2 a stable extension of the (E 1 , R 3 )-reduct of F 2 , then E 1 ∪ E 2 is a stable extension of F .
• Vice versa, if E is a stable extension of F , then E 1 = E ∩ A 1 is a stable extension of F 1 and E 2 = E ∩ A 2 a stable extension of the (E 1 , R 3 )-reduct of F 2 .
We can utilize this in order to find properties of repairs. Any stable extension contains a stable extension of F 1 . So F 1 has to be consistent wrt. credulous reasoning. This means when trying to find repairs for F , one may start with repairs of F 1 . In the following, we show that one can extend repairs of F 1 even to minimal repairs of F .
Proposition 5.13. Let (F 1 , F 2 , R 3 ) be a splitting of the AF F = (A, R) = (A 1 ∪ A 2 , R 1 ∪ R 2 ∪ R 3 ) where F 1 = (A 1 , R 1 ) and F 2 = (A 2 , R 2 ). If S 1 is a minimal stb-cred-diagnosis of F 1 , then there is a minimal stb-cred-diagnosis S of F with S 1 ⊆ S.
Proof. Let S 1 be a minimal stb-cred-diagnosis of F 1 . Let E 1 be a stable extension of (F 1 ) S 1 . Now consider F E 1 ,R 3 2 , i. e., the (E 1 , R 3 )-reduct of F 2 . If F E 1 ,R 3 2 possesses a stable extension, then we are done. If this is not the case, we need to be careful since two different extensions of (F 1 ) S 1 might induce two reducts where the minimal repairs are in a subset relation; so we cannot just take the minimal repair of F
. So assume for the moment there is an extension of (F 1 ) S 1 such that the reduct is not self-controversial and let
where we quickly observe that the minimum exists since we are dealing with finite AFs. Now let S = S 1 ∪ S 2 . We claim that S is a minimal diagnosis of F . For this, we observe that we cannot remove any element from S 1 since this was assumed to be a minimal diagnosis of F 1 and from Theorem 5.12 we know that it needs to possess a stable extension. Moreover, if we are given S 2 and the extension E 1 in which the minimum is attained, we see that F
possesses a stable extension ensuring that S is a diagnosis. Now, minimality is due to construction of S 2 . Finally, if the reduct is self-controversial for any extension of (F 1 ) S 1 , we can set S 2 = A 2 for argument-based and S 2 = R 2 for attack-based diagnoses.
Even though being rather simple, the most important observation in the previous proposition was that F 1 needs to be consistent in order for F to be consistent. We can phrase this observation in terms of SI A min (F ) and SI R min (F ), i. e., the strongly inconsistent sets of arguments and attacks.
Proposition 5.14. If (F 1 , F 2 , R 3 ) be a splitting of the AF F = (A,
Proof. We prove the first item. The second one is similar. Assume H 1 ∈ SI min (F 1 , stb, cred) = SI min (F 1 ). Then, for any set H 1 with H 1 ⊆ H 1 ⊆ A 1 the AF H 1 , (R 1 ) |H 1 has no stable extension. Due to Theorem 5.12, this implies H 1 , (R 1 ) |H 1 ∪ F 2 ∪ R 3 has no stable extension, either. Since we can also apply the splitting theorem after moving to a sub-AF of F 2 , we see that the AF
is inconsistent for any H 1 with H 1 ⊆ H 1 ⊆ A 1 and any H 2 with H 2 ⊆ A 2 . Thus, H is a strongly inconsistent sets of arguments of F . Minimality can be inferred from the splitting theorem in a similar way. Hence, H 1 ∈ SI A min (F ).
Let us now assume we are given SI A min (F 1 ). Due to the hitting set duality, i. e., Propositions 4.8 and 4.9 we find a minimal diagnosis of F 1 by removing a minimal hitting set S 1 of SI A min (F 1 ). In general it is not quite clear whether we can now extend S 1 to a minimal hitting set S of SI A min (F ). Due to SI A min (F 1 ) ⊆ SI A min (F ) we can surely extend S 1 to a hitting set of SI A min (F ), but minimality is not clear. We can however prove it via Proposition 5.13:
, then there is a minimal hitting set S of SI A min (F , stb, cred) (SI R min (F , stb, cred)) with S 1 ⊆ S.
Proof. Due to Propositions 4.8 and 4.9, S 1 is a minimal hitting set of SI A min (F 1 , stb, cred) (SI R min (F 1 , stb, cred)) iff S 1 is a minimal diagnosis of F 1 . Due to Proposition 5.13 there is a minimal diagnosis S of F with S 1 ⊆ S. Again due to Propositions 4.8 and 4.9, S is a minimal hitting set of SI A min (F , stb, cred) (SI R min (F , stb, cred)).
We want to mention that the situation differs when considering sceptical reasoning. If F 1 is such that stb(F 1 ) = ∅ but no argument is scepcitally accepted, then it might still be the case that F possesses a sceptically accepted argument due to F 2 . So consistency of F 1 is not a necessary condition anymore. It is, however, almost sufficient:
Proposition 5.16. Let (F 1 , F 2 , R 3 ) be a splitting of the AF F = (A, R) = (A 1 ∪ A 2 , R 1 ∪ R 2 ∪R 3 ) where F 1 = (A 1 , R 1 ) and F 2 = (A 2 , R 2 ). If F 1 is consistent wrt. sceptical reasoning and stable semantics, then so is F iff there is at least one extension E 1 ∈ stb(F 1 ) such that stb F
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 5.12.
So far, our investigation was restricted to stable semantics. The reason is quite simple: Theorem 5.12 is based on the (E 1 , R 3 )-reduct which require further adjustments to obtain the desired result for other semantics. The intuitive reason is that there might be arguments a ∈ A which are neither in a σ-extension E nor attacked by E if we consider σ = stb (see (Baumann, 2011) for more details). Formally, we consider the set of undefined arguments wrt. E (also known as undecided arguments) as follows.
Definition 5.17. If F = (A, R) is an AF, σ any semantics and E ∈ σ(F ), then the set of undefined arguments wrt. E is
To obtain the splitting result for other semantics, we use the (E 1 , R 3 )-reduct as usual, but in addition we introduce dummy attacks to those arguments in F 2 which are attacked by an undefined argument from F 1 wrt. E 1 . More precisely, the (S, L)-modification is defined as follows:
Definition 5.18 (Modification). Let F 2 = (A 2 , R 2 ) be an AF and A 1 such that A 1 ∩A 2 = ∅.
Please observe that we are not interested in mod
Theorem 5.19. [ (Baumann, 2011) ] Let (F 1 , F 2 , R 3 ) be a splitting of the AF F = (A, R) = (A 1 ∪A 2 , R 1 ∪R 2 ∪R 3 ) where F 1 = (A 1 , R 1 ) and F 2 = (A 2 , R 2 ). Let σ ∈ {stb, ad , pr , co, gr }.
• If E 1 is a σ-extension of F 1 and E 2 a σ-extension of the
, then E 1 ∪ E 2 is a σ-extension of F .
• Vice versa, if E is a σ-extension of F , then E 1 = E ∩ A 1 is a σ-extension of F 1 and
For stable semantics and credulous reasoning, the splitting theorem can be used to infer that consistency of F 1 is necessary for consistency of F . For the other semantics, it is not a necessary, but a sufficient condition.
Proposition 5.20. Let (F 1 , F 2 , R 3 ) be a splitting of the AF F = (A, R) = (A 1 ∪ A 2 , R 1 ∪ R 2 ∪ R 3 ). Let σ ∈ {ad , pr , co, gr }. If F 1 is consistent wrt. σ, then F is consistent wrt. σ as well. This holds for both credulous and sceptical reasoning.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 5.19. todo: obiges Theorem gilt auch für ideal semantics da jene directionality erfüllt (siehe meine diss Figure 2 .4).Überlass ich dir ob du dies mit reinnimmst.
The treatment of an AF using splitting is convenient since the structural properties induce strong results. It is thus not surprising, yet encouraging to see that this principle is capable of improving the investigation of diagnoses and repairs of AFs. As it turns out, splitting can be used to reduce the search space for repairs (see e.g. Proposition 5.20) or compute minimal diagnoses stepwise (as in Proposition 5.13). Moreoever, splitting is also meaningful when looking for strongly inconsistent arguments resp. attacks. We believe this is a promising research direction for further investigation, including concrete algorithms to compute repairs.
Infinite AFs
Until now, our investigation was restricted to finite AFs, i. e., F = (A, R) where A is a finite set of arguments (and thus R a finite set of attacks). Within this section we want to drop this restriction and investigate which results still hold. As usual, when moving from the finite to the infinite case, we are concerned about existence and uniqueness of certain sets as this might not be clear anymore (cf. (Baumann & Spanring, 2015 for a treatment of unrestricted AFs). In order to keep this section concise, we focus on universally defined semantics σ ∈ {co, pr , ss} and in addition gr since gr -diagnoses play an important role similar to the finite case described in Section 3.
So let us start with grounded semantics. In the finite case, we observed that an F is consistent wrt. grounded semantics iff there is at least one unattacked argument. Let us formally state that this is also the case for infinite AFs.
Proposition 5.21. If F = (A, R) is an infinite AF, then F possesses a non-empty grounded extension iff there is at least one unattacked argument.
is the grounded extension of F , not only for finite AFs. Due to monotony of the characteristic function Γ F , we have G = ∅ iff Γ F (∅) = ∅, i. e., iff there is an unattacked argument.
This also means we find gr -diagnoses as before, namely by removing arguments resp. attacks until at least one argument is unattacked. Hence: • argument-based grounded diagnosis iff it is not self-controversial,
• attack-based grounded diagnosis.
Whether a minimal gr -diagnosis exists for a given AF F = (A, R) is no longer trivial though since we cannot just move from a diagnosis S to a minimal one S . Indeed, when considering argument-based diagnoses, there is no minimal gr -diagnosis in general. It is easy to check that this AF possesses gr -diagnoses: Let j ∈ N. Then, there is an attack (i, j) ∈ R for each i ∈ N with i > j. So in order to obtain a gr -diagnosis of F we may remove each argument i with i > j, i. e., we let S j = {i > j | i ∈ N}. This is a diagnosis since no argument attacks j within F S j , so the grounded extension is non-empty. It is not minimal though since j was arbitrary. More precisely, for any j > j, the set S j is a gr -diagnosis of F as well satisfying S j ⊆ S j . Since we can always move to a smaller diagnosis, we see that there is no minimal one. todo: passt!
In case of attack-based diagnoses, the situation is different. We can guarantee the existence of minimal repairs and their structure is rather simple as we see in the proof of the following proposition.
Proposition 5.24. If F = (A, R) is an infinite AF, then there is a minimal attack-based gr -diagnosis.
Proof. Assume the grounded extension of F is empty. Let a ∈ A. Consider B = {(b, a) ∈ R | b ∈ A}. Observe B = ∅ due to Proposition 5.21. We claim that B is a minimal grdiagnosis of F . Since a is unattacked in F B , it is a diagnosis due to Proposition 5.21. Now consider S B. Then, F S contains an attack of the form (c, a) with (c, a) ∈ B \ S. Hence, a is attacked in F S . Since the grounded extension of F is empty and S ⊆ B, any other argument in F S is attacked as well. We thus see that F S is no gr -diagnosis of F . Since S was arbitrary, B is minimal. Now let σ ∈ {pr , co}. In (Dung, 1995) it has been noted that those semantics are also universally defined when considering infinite AFs. Thus given a gr -repair, we also have a σ-repair as in the finite case.
Proposition 5.25. Let F = (A, R) be an infinite AF and σ ∈ {pr , co}. If S is a grdiagnosis of F , then S is a σ-diagnosis of F as well. This holds for both reasoning modes.
Proof. Consider complete semantics and sceptical reasoning. Since the gr -extension is the least co-extension and nonempty for F S by assumption, we have that at least one argument, say a ∈ A, is sceptically accepted wrt. complete semantics. This also implies the claim for credulous reasoning. Now consider σ = pr . Recall that if E is a preferred extension, then it is a complete extension as well. Hence,
implying a is also sceptically accepted for preferred semantics. This finishes our proof.
Please observe that it is not trivial in general whether we can turn the σ-diagnosis we found in Proposition 5.25 into a minimal one. We note that Example 5.23 shows that minimal argument-based σ-diagnoses do not necessarily exist for σ ∈ {pr , co} since this example works analogously for σ ∈ {pr , co}.
So let us consider attack-based diagnoses. Consider complete semantics and credulous reasoning. There is a quite interesting reason why we do not expect minimal diagnoses to exist in general: Assume we are given a minimal gr -diagnosis S of an AF F = (A, R), similar to Proposition 5.25. As this is not necessarily a minimal co-diagnosis, we may try to move to a minimal subset S \ R such that S \ R is a co-diagnosis of F as well. This corresponds to returning the attacks in R to F S , i. e., moving to F S ∪R. Hence the following question arises: What is a maximal set R of attacks we can return such that there is still a complete extension? When given a complete extension E of F S , we clearly cannot return attacks that induce conflicts within E, but this is trivial. What we are more concerned about is defense, i. e., is E still admissible when augmenting F S with the attacks in R? To ensure this E must, roughly speaking, attack a sufficient amount of arguments in A. Hence, roughly speaking, R can be chosen bigger the more arguments E attacks. The problem is however that this -even though just intuition-corresponds to finding a semi-stable extension E of F S and existence of such is not guaranteed in general (Baumann & Spanring, 2015) .
Let us conclude this section we a short remark regarding so-called finitary AFs. In a finitary AF, each argument is only allowed to have finitely many attackers. This solves nearly all issues we had during this section with minimal diagnoses at once: Now, any grdiagnosis is necessarily finite and given a finite diagnosis, we can easily move to a minimal one. Hence, we obtain existence of minimal complete and preferred diagnoses. Moreover, any finitary AF possesses as semi-stable extension (Weydert, 2011; Baumann & Spanring, 2015) , so the same can be guaranteed here. An AF is finitary if any argument possesses finitely many attackers only.
Theorem 5.27. Let F be finitary. Any minimal gr -diagnosis of F is finite. If S is a gr -diagnosis of F , then there is a minimal gr -diagnosis S of F with S ⊆ S. If S is a minimal gr -diagnosis of F , then there is a minimal σ-diagnosis S of F with S ⊆ S for any σ ∈ {co, pr , ss}.
Proof. The claims about gr -diagnoses are clear. Given a finite gr -diagnosis, apply Proposition 5.25 to obtain a finite σ-diagnosis for σ ∈ {co, pr }. Due to finiteness, one can turn this diagnosis into a minimal one. Moreover, due to (Weydert, 2011) , any finitare AF F possesses a semi-stable extension. Now if F S is a minimal gr -repair, then there is at least one unattacked argument. It is easy to see that this occurs in each semi-stable extension, so S is a ss-diagnosis as well. Again we can move to a minimal one due to finiteness.
When investigating infinite instead of finite AFs, one needs to accept the possibility that certain results are not conveyed. In our case, the investigation showed that argumentbased diagnoses are somewhat clumsy and minimality can almost never be guaranteed. It is worth mentioning that a reasonably simple example suffices to demonstrate this for all considered semantics and both reasoning modes. However, even when considering attackbased diagnoses the situation is not too much better. Here, minimal gr -diagnoses always exist (and thus, minimal scep-co-diagnoses as well) and their structure is quite simple. For the other semantics, however, the situation is as before. The only difference is that our counterexamples take more effort. As formalized in Theorem 5.27, the issues we faced within this section stem from the infinite number of attacks (to single arguments) rather than the infinite number of arguments.
Computational Complexity
In this section we discuss the computational complexity of two decision problems that naturally arise, namely the existence problem as well as the verification problem regarding minimal repairs. To keep this section varied and within a reasonable space, we mostly restrict our investigation to σ ∈ {gr , co, pr , stb}. We also consider argument-based diagnoses only. We believe that this suffices to demonstrate the reader how to derive the expected results.
We assume the reader to be familiar with the polynomial hierarchy. Furthermore, we consider the differences classes (Papadimitriou, 1994) . In the following let σ be a semantics and one of the considered reasoning modes, i. e., ∈ {cred, scep}.
Ex-Min-Repair σ, Input: An AF F Output: true iff there is a minimal σ--diagnosis for F Ver-Min-Repair σ, Input: (F , S) where F = (A, R) is an AF and S ⊆ A Output: true iff S minimal σ--diagnosis for F We start with the problem of deciding whether a minimal repair exists. As we know from Theorems 3.16, 3.19 and Fact 3.21 it suffices to perform a simple syntactical check, which can be done in linear time. In particular, it does not matter which reasoning mode is considered. We thus find: Proposition 6.3. For ∈ {cred, scep}, the problem Ver-Min-Repair gr , is in P.
Proof. If F S contains no unattacked argument, we reject. Argument-based : If F S contains an unattacked argument, we check whether this is the case for each F S\{α} with α ∈ S. If this is not the case, then S must be minimal. Attack-based : S is minimal iff F itself is inconsistent and S is of the form {(b, a) ∈ R | b ∈ A} for an a ∈ A.
We want to mention that we can even compute all gr -diagnoses in P. We believe this observation is relevant since the grounded repairs play an essential role as the results from Section 3 suggest. Assume we are given the AF F = (A, R) with gr (F ) = {∅}. Since a grounded diagnosis needs to ensure that at least one argument a ∈ A is not attacked anymore, we can successively look at any a ∈ A and consider S = {b ∈ A | (b, a) ∈ R} for argument-based diagnoses and S = {(b, a) ∈ R | b ∈ A} for attack-based diagnoses. If S is a minimal gr -diagnosis (verification is in P due to Proposition 6.3), we add S to our list, otherwise we delete it. Since there are at most |A| gr -diagnoses, this procedure is in P. So:
Proposition 6.4. Computing all gr -diagnoses of a given AF F can be done in P. Now, even though finding a σ-diagnosis may become rather hard depending on σ, we can efficiently compute all gr -diagnoses and then utilize Lemmata 3.15, 3.18 and 3.22 in order to reduce the search space. This approach explains the central role of grounded semantics. In a nutshell, the gr -repairs can be seen as a (polynomial time computable) starting point in order to find minimal repairs for other semantics. A thorough investigation of this approach is part of future work. Moreover, the investigation of further subclasses of AFs seems rather promising considering computational complexity. For example, the ones we considered trivialize credulous diagnoses in almost any case. Other restrictions might ensure tractability of certain problems we considered here while being less restrictive.
Universally Defined Semantics
Considering the computational complexity of different reasoning problems in AFs, it is quite unsurprising that Ver-Min-Repair σ,cred is intractable for most semantics σ as it requires checking whether a non-empty extension exists. Due to the additional minimality check we require, our problem turns out to be in the corresponding difference class.
Proof. Membership is due to Proposition 6.2. For hardness, we reduce the problem MC which is defined as follows: Given a formula Φ in 3-CNF, i. e., Φ = C 1 ∧, . . . , ∧C r . We abuse notation and identify a formula with a set of clauses, i. e., Φ = {C 1 , . . . , C r }. Let ϑ be a subformula, i. e., ϑ is w. l. o. g. of the form ϑ = {C 1 , . . . , C s } with {C 1 , . . . , C s } ⊆ {C 1 , . . . , C r }. The problem MC is given via MC Input: (Φ, ϑ) where Φ is a formula in 3-CNF and ϑ ⊆ Φ Output: true iff ϑ is satisfiable, but any formula ϑ with ϑ ϑ ⊆ Φ is not.
. . The problem MC is D p 1 -complete (Papadimitriou, 1994) . So let Φ be as above. Let x 1 , ..., x n be the literals occurring in Φ, set ¬¬x i = x i . We can prove hardness utilizing a minor adjustment of the standard construction (see (Dvorák & Dunne, 2018) ) depicted in Figure 2 (a). Let F be the AF F = (A, R) with A = {x 1 , ¬x 1 , . . . , x n , ¬x n , C 1 , . . . , C r , Φ, Φ} and
Consider σ = ad . It is well-known that Φ is satisfiable iff there is a non-emtpy admissible extension of the framework depicted in Figure 2 (a) . The reader may verify that a non-empty admissible extension E needs to contain some of the X arguments. In order to defended them, Φ ∈ E is required. In order to find an admissible set of arguments defending Φ, the formula needs to be satisfiable. Now let ϑ be a subformula of Φ, i. e., ϑ is w. l. o. g. of the form ϑ = {C 1 , . . . , C s }. Then, (Φ, ϑ) is "yes" instance of MC iff (F , S) with S = {C s+1 , . . . , C r } is a "yes" instance of Ver-Min-Repair ad,cred .
Clearly, any framework possesses a non-empty admissible extension iff this is the case for σ = co and σ = pr We turn to sceptical reasoning. First observe that for ad semantics, the problem is trivial since any framework possess an empty admissible extension.
Recall that the unique grounded extension of an AF F is complete as well. Moreover we have gr (F ) ⊆ co(F ). Hence, any framework F possesses a sceptically accepted argument wrt. grounded semantics if and only if this is the case for complete semantics. Hence, applying Proposition 6.3 yields: Corollary 6.6. Ver-Min-Repair co,scep is in P. Now we consider σ = pr . Recall that deciding whether an argument is sceptically accepted is Π p 2 -complete (Dvorák & Dunne, 2018) . Thus, given a framework F and a set S ⊆ A of arguments, the decision problem Ver-Min-Repair pr ,scep involves checking whether for all S with S ⊆ S the framework F S does not possess a sceptically accepted argument. Since the latter check is in Σ p 2 for each S , we immediately see a Π p 3 upper bound for Ver-Min-Repair pr ,scep due to Proposition 6.2. So the main work for the following theorem is the lower bound:
Theorem 6.7. Ver-Min-Repair pr ,scep is Π p 3 -complete. Proof. Membership is due to Proposition 6.2. Recall the construction from (Dvorák & Dunne, 2018) with the property that the AF accepts an argument sceptically wrt. preferred semantics if and only if a formula Φ = ∀Y ∃X : φ(X, Y ) in CNF evaluates to true.
. . .
In order to prove hardness in Π p 3 for our problem we somehow need to simulate an additional quantifier. This, however, comes natural since the decision problem Ver-Min-Repair pr ,scep involves consideration of all subsets S of a given set S ⊆ A of arguments.
So let us assume we are given a formula Ψ = ∃Z ∀Y ∃X : ψ(X, Y, Z) in CNF. we augment the construction from (Dvorák & Dunne, 2018) with the intention that Ψ evaluates to true if and only if (F , S) is a "no" instance of Ver-Min-Repair pr ,scep (that is, there exists a subset S with S S such that F S possesses a sceptically accepted argument wrt. preferred semantics).
We augment the construction H Π p 2
. We will construct an AF F = (A, R) with a set S ⊆ A of arguments with the following properties:
• F S itself is consistent, i. e., there is a sceptically accepted argument,
• subsets of S, i. e., the sets S ⊆ S may correspond to assignments to the Z-variables,
• there is one S with S S such that F S is consistent if and only if the formula Ψ = ∃Z ∀Y ∃X : ψ(X, Y, Z) evaluates to true.
The first and the last item together ensure that (F , S) is a "yes" instance of Ver-Min-Repair pr ,scep if and only if the formula Ψ is false.
Before depicting and explaining our construction, we name all arguments occurring in the AF. We hope this helps readability of the proof. Which attacks we include will be explained later. Our framework is F = (A, R) with A = {x 1 , ¬x 1 , . . . , x n , ¬x n , y 1 , ¬y 1 , . . . , y m , ¬y m , z 1 , ¬z 1 , z 1 , ¬z 1 , . . . , z t , ¬z t , z t , ¬z t , C 1 , . . . , C r , D 1,1 , . . . , D 1,4 , . . . , D t,1 , . . . , D t,4 , Φ, , ⊥} Moreover, we set
We will see that sets S with S ⊆ S induce AFs F S with the intuition that we assign values to Z variables.
So first we consider Z variables z 1 , ¬z 1 , . . . , z t , ¬z t which attack the C 1 , . . . , C r in the natural way: We have (z j , C i ) ∈ R iff z j occurs in the clause C i and (¬z j , C i ) ∈ R iff ¬z j occurs in the clause C i . We also consider copies z 1 , ¬z 1 , . . . , z t , ¬z t .
The reason for the copies z 1 , . . . , ¬z t is to ensure that the Z arguments themselves are not sceptically accepted. Now consider the following gadged, which will be included for any Z variable.
The dummy arguments D i,1 and D i,2 as well as their attacks are depicted with dotted lines to illustrate that they do not occur in F S , as those arguments belong to S. Augmenting F S with D i,1 , for example, ensures that z i and z i are never defended and thus occur in no preferred extension. Hence, this choice corresponds to letting z i be false. The role of the D i,3 and D i,4 becomes apparent considering the following arguments:
Now, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , t} we observe: Since D i,3 and D i,4 attack all arguments in H Π p 2 we have that {D 1,3 , . . . , D t,3 } and {D 1,4 , . . . , D t,4 } are two preferred extensions for any F S with S ⊆ S which contains both D i,1 and D i,2 , i. e., in F S occur neither D i,1 nor D i,2 .
Hence, the intersection pr (F S ) is empty. We thus see: A framework F S with S ⊆ S can only possess a sceptically accepted argument if for each i ∈ {1, . . . , t} both D i,1 and D i,2 occur in S . Now assume this is given, i. e., we have a framework F S with S ⊆ S as described. Recall that the choice of the D i,1 and D i,2 naturally corresponds to a (partial) assignment ω : Z → {0, 1}. As in the original construction H Π p 2 we see that Φ is sceptically accepted iff ∀Y ∃X : ψ(X, Y, Z) evaluates to true under the assignment ω : Z → {0, 1}. In this case, F S is consistent. Since this applies to any S of the form described above we see: Every F S with S ⊆ S is inconsistent iff for any assignment ω : Z → {0, 1} the formula ∀Y ∃X : ψ(X, Y, Z) evaluates to false iff the formula ∃Z ∀Y ∃X : ψ(X, Y, Z) evaluates to false.
To summarize, we have established: ∃Z ∀Y ∃X : ψ(X, Y, Z) is false iff F S is inconsistent for all S S. The latter nearly means that (F , S) for S = A \ H is a positive instance of Ver-Min-Repair pr ,scep . What we have left to do is to make sure that F S itself is consistent, i. e., there is at least one sceptically accepted argument. The following final gadget does the job:
There is no other argument attacking . Hence, as long as no D i,1 resp. D i,2 argument is chosen, is sceptically accepted. As soon as a proper superset of H is under consideration, can never be defended and is thus rendered pointless.
Stable Semantics
Let us now turn to our only example for collapsing semantics, namely σ = stb. If we are interested in credulous reasoning, we face a similar situation as in Theorem 6.5.
Proof. Membership is due to Proposition 6.2. For hardness, utilize the construction depicted in Figure 2 (b) as in the proof of Theorem 6.5.
We turn to sceptical reasoning. Since finding a stable extension is NP-complete it is not hard to see that there is a coNP lower bound for sceptical reasoning. However, as the framework in question might collapse, we also need to verify that there is at least one stable extension of a given framework. The result is a D p 1 lower bound (see (Rahwan & Simari, 2009) Proof. Membership is due to Proposition 6.2. For hardness, recall how to prove that sceptical reasoning is coNP-complete for stable semantics. Given a formula Φ = ∃X : φ(X) where φ is a formula over variables in X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } in 3-CNF with φ(x) = C 1 ∧ . . . ∧ C r recall the following construction H Φ from (Rahwan & Simari, 2009) . It has the property that the AF accepts Φ sceptically wrt. stable semantics if and only if Φ = ∃X : φ(X) evaluates to false.
We augment this construction in order to show that Ver-Min-Repair stb,scep is Π p 2 -hard. We proceed as in the proof of Theorem 6.7. We construct an AF F = (A, R) and consider S ⊆ A as well as the induces sub-AF F S . We need to check whether in F S any argument is sceptically accepted, while this is not the case for any F S with S S. Hence, we may also take possible subsets of S into account. Assume we are given a formula Ψ = ∀Y ∃X : ψ(X, Y ) with X as above and Y = {y 1 , . . . , y m }. Assume ψ(X, Y ) = ψ is in CNF with ψ = C 1 ∧ . . . ∧ C r . We will construct a sub-AF F S with the following properties:
• subsets of S, i. e., the sets S ⊆ S may correspond to assignments to the Y -variables,
• there is no AF F S with S S which is consistent if and only if the formula Ψ = ∀Y ∃X : ψ(X, Y ) evaluates to true.
The first and the last item together ensure that (F , S) with S is a "yes" instance of Ver-Min-Repair stb,scep if and only if the formula Ψ is true.
Before depicting and explaining our construction we give the arguments A of the AF F = (A, R) as we did in the proof of Theorem 6.7. We have A = {x 1 , ¬x 1 , . . . , x n , ¬x n , y 1 , ¬y 1 , . . . , y m , ¬y m , C 1 , . . . , C r , Φ, Φ,Φ, y 1 ?, . . . , y m ?, all?, } Moreover, our subset S ⊆ A is S = {y 1 , ¬y 1 , . . . , y m , ¬y m }.
For the moment it suffices to observe that sets S with S ⊆ S correspond to choosing y arguments.
Please observe that H Φ from above possesses a stable extension containing only Φ. Our first step is consideration of a similar argument which will be calledΦ. Similar to Φ, the argumentΦ attacks all arguments. Moreover,Φ and Φ attack each other.
This framework has at least two stable extensions, namely Φ andΦ. Note the intended asymmetry between the two arguments: Φ is attacked by Φ whileΦ is not. The reason is as follows: The purpose of Φ is as in the original construction to control whether there is a satisfying assignment to the given formula or not. This is why it needs to be attacked by Φ. However,Φ is utilized to render some sub-AFs F S with S ⊆ S inconsistent as we will see later. This is why there is no attack from Φ toΦ.
As our next step, we consider arguments y 1 , ¬y 1 , . . . , y m , ¬y m which shall correspond to the Y -variables in the given formula Ψ = ∀Y ∃X : ψ(X, Y ). As already pointed out, they do not occur in the AF F S as they belong to S. So, a subset S with S ⊆ S somewhat corresponds to a partial assignment ω : Y → {0, 1}. Similar to the X arguments, they attack the arguments C 1 , . . . , C r in the natural way: We have (y j , C i ) ∈ R iff y j occurs in the clause C i and (¬y j , C i ) ∈ R iff ¬y j occurs in the clause C i . Note that the Y arguments do not attack each other.
. . . The Y arguments as well as their attacks are depicted with dotted lines to illustrate that they do not occur in F S . Now let us make sure that only intended subsets of {y 1 , ¬y 1 , . . . , y m , ¬y m } are important. Recall that they shall correspond to assignments ω : Y → {0, 1}. Interestingly, we only need to prune away partial assignments, i. e., cases where there is an index j such that neither y j nor ¬y j occurs in F S . The case that both y j and ¬y j occur in F S -actually not corresponding to a well-defined assignment-does no harm. Consider the following additional arguments and attacks: We thus see the following: For any F S with S ⊆ S there is always a stable extension containing Φ. There is another stable extension containingΦ iff for at least one index j neither y j nor ¬y j occur in F S . Then, no argument is sceptically excepted. The AF F S is thus inconsistent. Now let us assume that for any index j there is either y j or ¬y j occurring in F S . Then we see that there are two cases:
1. The formula ∃X : ψ(X, Y ) evaluates to true under the corresponding assignment ω : Y → {0, 1}. Then, as in the construction from (Rahwan & Simari, 2009) there is a stable extension containing the corresponding X arguments as well as Φ, but not Φ. Hence, no argument is sceptically accepted.
2. The formula ∃X : ψ(X, Y ) evaluates to false under the corresponding assignment ω : Y → {0, 1}. Then, Φ is sceptically accepted.
Hence, the formula ∀Y ∃X : ψ(X, Y ) is true iff the former case always occurs. Assume this is the case. Now consider a choice of the Y -variables which does not correspond to a well-defined assignment, i. e., there is j such that both y j and ¬y j occur in F S . It is clear that for this AF F S we also have the former case, i. e., no argument is sceptically accepted since this was already the case with only y j or ¬y j occurring in the AF.
To summarize, we have established: ∀Y ∃X : ψ(X, Y ) is true iff F S is inconsistent for all S S. The latter nearly means that (F , S) is a positive instance of Ver-Min-Repair stb,scep . What we have left to do is to make sure that F S itself is consistent, i. e., there is at least one sceptically accepted argument. The following final gadget does the job:
There is no other argument attacking . Hence, as long as no Y argument is chosen, is sceptically accepted. As soon as a proper superset of S is under consideration, is rendered pointless.
Subclasses
Let us briefly discuss the subclasses of AFs we mentioned in Section 3. If the AF in question is symmetric, Ex-Min-Repair σ,cred trivializes for any σ we considered in this paper since irreflexivity ensures that the AF is not self-controversial. The problem Ver-Min-Repair σ,cred is trivial for σ ∈ {ad , stb, pr , co} since any symmetric AF possesses a credulously accepted argument. Hence, (F , S) is a positive instance of Ver-Min-Repair σ,cred (with σ ∈ {ad , stb, pr , co}) iff S = ∅. It is easy to see that Ver-Min-Repair gr ,cred can be solved in linear time. If the framework is compact or acyclic, there is inherently nothing to solve wrt. credulous reasoning. Sceptical reasoning is similarly easy.
The results of this section show that the problem of verifying a given minimal diagnosis is rather demanding from a computational point of view. More precisely, in every case the upper bound given in Proposition 6.1 -which is rather generic and thus appears to be weakis either a lower bound as well or there is a quite trivial reason why this is not the case. An example for the latter is σ = ad and = scep. This observation emphasizes the importance of grounded diagnoses as they reduce the search space for every other case except σ = stb. In view of that, tractability of computing all grounded diagnoses is quite encouraging.
How to Repair? -A Short Case Study
As mentioned before, due to Lemmata 3.15, 3.18 and 3.22 we may reduce the search space for diagnoses as long as we are equipped with an already computed grounded one. If one is interested in all diagnoses, the notion of strong inconsistency in order to use the hitting set duality might be useful. The aim of this section is to briefly demonstrate how to repair a given AF. We discuss both credulous and sceptical reasoning.
First let us consider an example with stable semantics. Let us start with credulous reasoning. It is well-known that in case of finite AFs the non-existence of acceptable positions implies the existence of odd-cycles. This means, by contraposition, one possible strategy for repairing AFs in case of stable semantics is to break odd-cycles. This approach corresponds to the minimal stb-repairs F {a} , F {b} and F {c} from Example 1.1. Since possessing odd-cycles is not sufficient for the collapse of stable semantics further considerations are required. Indeed, in case of our running example, we have seen that eliminating the arguments e and f results in a minimal stb-repair, namely F {e,f } , too. Regarding the principle of minimal change one may argue that breaking the odd-cycle in F has to be preferred over the latter strategy since less arguments are involved. The following slightly modified version of this example shows that this observation is not true in general. A further intensive study of this issue will be part of future work.
Example 7.1. Consider the following AF F . One may easily confirm that there are 9 minimal cred-stb-diagnoses, namely {a i , b j , c k } with i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. They comply with the idea to break all odd loops of the given AF. However, {e} is a minimal cred-stb-diagnosis as well, and arguably the most immediate one. As the reader may have already observed, the same applies to attack-based diagnoses. For example, {(a 1 , a 2 ), (b 1 , b 2 ), (c 1 , c 2 )} is an attack-based diagnosis breaking all odd loops. However, consideration of {(e, d)} suffices.
The subsequent example considers a semantical defect wrt. preferred semantics which is tackled via grounded repairs. Our goal is to find a minimal scep-pr -diagnosis S, i.e., a set S such that pr F S = ∅ and pr F S = ∅. Lemma 3.18 suggests that looking for gr -repairs is a reasonable starting point. In order to guarantee at least one unattacked argument one finds {c, d} as minimal gr -diagnosis. Let F {c,d} denote the associated minimal repair. We have gr F {c,d} = {{e}}. Hence, pr F {c,d} = ∅ is implied. This means, {c, d} is a scep-pr -diagnosis. Moreover, {c, d} is even minimal proven by the following two AFs F {c} and F {d} . Indeed, we have pr F {c} = pr F {d} = ∅ since {a, e}, {d, f } ∈ pr F {c} and {a, e}, {c, f } ∈ pr F {d} .
Related Work and Future Directions
In this paper, we investigated approaches aiming at repairing argumentation frameworks which are inconsistent in the sense that they do not possess any accepted argument. We considered a reasonable range of semantics, the standard reasoning modes, namely credulous and sceptical reasoning, and two different tools to repair, namely removal of a certain (minimal) sets of arguments or attacks. We identified repairs wrt. grounded semantics as the arguably most important case: They can be utilized as a starting point in order to calculate repairs wrt. other semantics, coincide for both reasoning modes and are tractable from an algorithmic point of view. We illustrated how to derive stronger results for specific situations like restricting the AFs to certain subclasses or if AFs allows for a splittin. We also investigated infinite AFs. We studied the computational complexity of two natural arising reasoning problems, i. e., existence and verification of repairs. Our hardness results confirm the central role of the tractable gr -diagnoses. In a short case study, we illustrate how to repair a concrete AF under consideration. The topic of diagnoses and repairs as introduced in (Reiter, 1987) is less developed in the area of abstract argumentation. The closest one to our work is (Nouioua & Würbel, 2014) . The authors define an operator and provide an algorithm, s.t. the resulting framework does not collapse. The mentioned work considers a semantical defect as the absence of any extension. Consequently, only stable semantics can be considered in contrast to our setup which additionally includes a treatment of semantics which may provide the empty set as unique extension. All semantics known from the literature do so. Moreover, restoring consistency is achieved via dropping a minimal set of arguments or attacks. In the latter case, all arguments survive the revision process.
The very first and basic works which are dealing with dynamics in abstract argumentation are (Baumann & Brewka, 2010; Baumann, 2012; Baumann & Brewka, 2013) as well as (Cayrol, de Saint-Cyr, & Lagasquie-Schiex, 2010; Bisquert, Cayrol, de Saint-Cyr, & Lagasquie-Schiex, 2011) . The first two are tackling the so-called enforcing problem wrt. possibility as well as minimal change. More precisely, they are dealing with the question whether it is possible (and if yes, as little effort as possible) to add new information in such a way that a desired set of arguments becomes an extension or at least a subset of one. In (Kim, Ordyniak, & Szeider, 2013 ) the authors studied this problem under the name σ-repair and provided parametrized complexity results. Although adding information as well as desired sets are not the focus of our study there is at least one interesting similarity to our work, namely: given an AF where nothing is credulously accepted, then enforcing a certain non-empty set can be seen as a special kind of repairing. The other two works are case studies of what happens with the set of extensions if one deletes or adds one argument. The so-called destructive change is somehow the inverse of our notion of credulous repair since the initial framework possesses at least one credulously accepted argument whereas the result does not. Quite recently, in (Baumann & Brewka, 2019 ) the so-called extension removal problem was studied. That is, is it possible to modify a given AF in such a way that certain undesired extensions are no longer generated?
Several future directions are already mentioned in the text. The most apparent one stems from the observation that our approach involves removal of attacks resp. arguments only. One could extend this approach to adding information as well. Moreover, a further intensive study of subclasses of AFs seems to be very promising since certain useful semantical properties are already ensured by syntactic properties. Furthermore, it is already known that AFs can be seen as a restricted class of logic programs (LPs). More precisely, as shown in (Strass, 2013, Theorem 4.13) there is a standard translation T from AFs to LPs, s.t. for any AF F , σ(F ) coincides with τ (T (F )) for certain pairs of semantics σ and τ . This means, one interesting research question is to which extent our results can be conveyed to repairing in logic programming.
